

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Talks on Missile Technology Control with the Soviets

FROM:

Assistant  
National Intelligence Officer  
for Strategic Programs

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

16 November 1988

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TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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Chairman/NIC

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This is an issue much more important than it may seem at 1st glance. Another case where disorder at the end of an administration may permit mid-level bureaucrats to do lasting damage.

P.E.

DATE

## TRANSMITTAL SLIP

16 Nov 88

TO:

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

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National Intelligence Council

NIC-03319/88

16 November 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: [REDACTED]

Assistant National Intelligence Officer for  
Strategic Programs

SUBJECT: Talks on Missile Technology Control with the  
Soviets

1. Action required. None at this time, although you may wish to address the issue with General Powell or Secretary Shultz or Secretary Carlucci at your next opportunity. The issue will likely escalate to your level in the next week or so.

2. Background. As a follow-on to earlier discussions with the Soviets, a US working-level delegation is scheduled to go to Moscow 1-2 December for "technical discussions" about missile proliferation, and to explore possibilities for engaging the Soviets in either our Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), or some other mechanism. The Soviets have their own counter-proposal which has some elements of interest to the US, but also presents many political and technical problems. In preparing for the Moscow talks, it is becoming increasingly clear [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] that policy coordination is sadly lacking, even (or especially) at the National Security Council (NSC) level. There appears to be little relationship between these missile proliferation talks with the Soviets and other ongoing arms control talks, for example, although the Soviets are proceeding as though they are linked (even to the extent of heading their delegation with a member of their nuclear test negotiation team).

3. Several other agencies, including the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, parts of the Office of Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, share our concerns, and expressed strong reservations about both the timing and content of the talks in a meeting Tuesday of the senior-level Arms Control Support Group (ACSG). In that meeting, the attached Talking

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Points were used by the DCI's representative, [REDACTED] of ACIS. It is likely that these agencies, with our support, will lobby the State Department and the NSC to strictly limit the scope and agenda of the Moscow talks, or even better from our perspective, postpone the talks until either: 1) US policy is better formulated and coordinated, or 2) the new Administration takes over. So far this has been pretty much a State Department/Political-Military Affairs show, but the issue is likely to be elevated soon to the Policy Review Group (PRG) level.

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4. DCI Equities. As detailed in the Talking Points, there are two chief concerns for intelligence:

- Protection of sources and methods of any intelligence data used in discussions with the Soviets. State does not have a good track record on this issue.
- Potential conflicts with START and other arms control efforts, some of which could bear on monitoring issues as well as policy. For example, the MTCR contains definitions of missile-related terminology which may be at odds with US positions in START.

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5. This memorandum has been coordinated with ACIS, OSWR, and SOVA. Please let me know if you would like any additional information.

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Attachment:  
As stated

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